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Introduction*  
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 great changes have taken place in 
the former socialist countries of Europe and the Soviet Union. The three 
communist federations Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
disintegrated into 22 separate countries. An estimated 45.3 million people 
were left outside their ethnic states and there has been an outburst of ethnic 
conflicts.1  Many of the new states had previously little experience with self-
government and independence as they, along with the other former socialist 
countries, embarked on a path of transition towards market economy. The 
transition has been associated with a dramatic decline in income and growing 
poverty. The estimated decline in output for the region (1989-1996) represents 
the largest peacetime contraction of World output after the Great Depression 
of 1929-33 (Milanovic 1998).  
 Foreign capital inflows are viewed as being of fundamental importance 
both in transition and in economic development. Special interest has been paid 
to the inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) which may increase the 
aggregate investment rate and activity in the region. There is also an emphasis 
on the possible positive externalities such as the transfer of technology.  
 This study aim at identifying determinants of the FDI inflow into 25 of 
the former centrally planned economies during the period 1994-1998. The 
countries included are the former Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, and 
the ten Central and Eastern European countries Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. In spite of the vast potential of the region, the 
transition economies collectively received less FDI annually than did Mexico 
up until 1994.2 FDI into the region is unevenly distributed, Poland receiving 
close to 25 percent of the inflow on average from 1994-1998. Excluding the 
                                            
* I am grateful to Hildegunn K. Nordås and Arve Ofstad for valuable comments. 
1 Source: (CIA 1993). 
2 Source: (UNCTAD 1999).  
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three Baltic States the former Soviet Union accounts for 60 percent of total 
GDP and 70 percent of the population but only 30 percent of the total FDI 
inflow into the region.  
The first part of the paper is devoted to a description of developments in the 
region; focus being on traits which may influence the ability of a country to 
attract foreign investment. The theoretical framework within which the 
analysis is performed is presented in the second part. Previous empirical 
findings on the impact and determinants of FDI in the region are reviewed in 
part 3, where hypotheses for empirical testing are suggested. Following a short 
descriptive analysis of the FDI inflow to the region 1994-1998, results from 
the regression analysis testing the suggested hypotheses are reported in part 5.  
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1  A review of economic and social 
developments 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) offers the 
following definition of transition: “Transition is the process through which 
open marked oriented economies are established. It involves changing and 
creating new institutions” (EBRD 1994).  
 The former centrally planned economies faced great challenges as they 
embarked on the path of transition from command to market economy. 
Common problems were the lack of market-oriented infrastructure and little 
integration in the world economy. An introduction to the old regime is 
warranted providing insight to the challenges of transition. A short 
recapitulation on selected issues is therefore presented in section 1.1, followed 
by an account of recent trends, such as the progress in transition and some 
features of the economic and social development, that are of interest when 
addressing the presence of foreign capital.    
1.1  The old regime 
There is a continued debate as to when the Soviet decline in output growth 
started. Official statistics indicate it started in the 1970s, whereas other 
sources indicate it was apparent already in the 1960s (Desai 1987;Easterly and 
Fischer 1995). It is common to distinguish between two sets of factors causing 
the decline (IMF, et al. 1991). The first is related to choice of growth strategy 
and the second to deficiencies within the planning system itself. Soviet 
economic growth was of an “extensive” nature and depended upon increases 
in the quantity rather than the productivity of inputs.3 The choice of strategy 
brought about a rapid mobilisation of labour, high savings and investment 
rates and an extensive use of natural resources. According to Desai (1987, 
pg.8 table 1.1) the growth rate of the workforce was lower than capital 
                                            
3 The annual change in capital to output ratio 1950-1987 was 2.53 in the case of the Soviet 
Union  (Easterly and Fischer 1995). 
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accumulation (1951-1980) and the capital to labour ratio consequently 
increased. Diminishing returns to capital and declining total factor 
productivity growth would then contribute to the Soviet decline in output 
growth. Easterly and Fischer (1995) claims that the low elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour rather than growth strategy explains 
the poor performance.4 Studies such as Bergson (1994) conclude that 
productivity in the communist economies (Hungary, Poland, Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia) were 29.5-34.3 percent below the average of USA, Western 
Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Japan and Spain. Some have also suggested 
that the underdeveloped service sector, especially producer services, in the 
former socialist countries of Europe and in the Soviet Union contributed to the 
stagnation and breakdown of these economies (Fox 2000;Illeris 1996).   
Central planning meant having more than 90 percent of production 
under direct state control (IMF, et al. 1991). Gosplan was responsible for co-
ordinating the whole economic life of the country. By 1987 this implied 
harmonising the interests of over 37,000 enterprises and production 
associations, 26,300 collective and 23,000 state farms (Sakwa 1989). The 
primary target was specified in terms of physical volume of production and 
financial and efficiency objectives were of secondary importance. Rewards for 
managers and ministers were tied closely to plan fulfillment. Direct 
competition was being suppressed, loss-making enterprises were rarely shut 
down and production tended to be highly concentrated. The five-year plans 
established the balance between heavy and consumer goods, and set more 
detailed directives to individual plants. Heavy industry was along side the 
defense industry given high priority.5 At the time of the launch of the first 
Sputnik in 1957 there was a lack of consumer goods in the Soviet Union. 
Intent on maintaining stability planners set producer and retail prices rather 
than allowing them to be determined by the market. The fixed prices led to 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 Weitzman (1970) found the elasticity of substitution to be 0.4 in the case of the USSR. A low 
elasticity of substitution was found also in the case of Yugoslavia (0.13) (Sapir 1980) and in 
the Czechoslovakian industry (0.1) (Rusek 1989).  
5 The share of GDP spent on defence was higher than that in the USA. Gates (1995) refer 
estimates varying between 15-30percent of GDP in the Soviet Union during the Cold War as 
compared to the US share of 6.3percent. 
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shortages, queuing and an extensive black market. There is a general belief 
that one of the major problems faced by reforming centrally planned 
economies today, organised crime, came as a result of the shortcomings of the 
planned economy (Anderson 1995;Voronin 1997).  
 Features of low productivity combined with a high level of human 
capital suggest a potential role for foreign investors, as does the high level of 
state ownership. Foreign capital may contribute in the privatisation process 
and in terms of introducing new technology. A high level of human capital 
implies that new technologies may be introduced at greater ease than in 
countries with a lower level of human capital. The privatisation process may 
to some extent invite foreign capital especially when there is a shortage of 
capital in the host country itself. The underdeveloped service sector holds a 
high potential for liberalisation and expansion, providing significant return on 
investment and efficiency gains in the economy.  In particular there is a 
growing body of empirical literature implying a positive relationship between 
a well functioning financial sector and economic growth (King and Levine 
1993a;b). The extent of crime, corruption and the unofficial economy on the 
other hand deter foreign participation in the domestic economy.  
1.2  The new order 
The question of how to handle the transition from plan- to market economy 
has led to immense controversy as to the choice of transition strategy, how to 
define different strategies and consequently on which strategies the empirical 
evidence supports.6 Sachs (1993) claims that the transition from a socialist to a 
market economy is a well-trodden path. Both Kuttner (1991) and Zuzowski 
(1998), on the other hand make a point of the uniqueness of this process. 
Kuttner (1991) claims that earlier transitions from authoritarian rule did not 
to the same degree imply having to reinvent “....capitalism from scratch.” Also 
Zuzowski (1998) points to the importance of the past in understanding the 
developments of today. He claims modern market economy was never present 
in the former socialist economies, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, even 
                                            
6 For an insight to the debate see for example Jeffries (1996).  
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before communist rule. The countries are consequently facing the 
introduction, not reintroduction, of market economy and liberal democracy.  
 
 
1.2.1 Economic and social developments 1989-1998 
Most empirical studies find the inflow of FDI to be positively affected by 
market size. The combination of low wages and high skills, such as is found in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union is also 
believed to attract FDI.7 However, the region appears to have experienced a 
deterioration of human capital during transition.  
 The transition has been accompanied by low or negative GDP growth 
rate for a longer period of time. On average, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)8 has experienced six years of negative GDP growth 
during the period 1990-1997. The average for the Baltic (B) countries is five, 
and for CEE it is 3.5.9  The development in GDP in constant 1995 US$ is 
depicted in figure 1 along with the development in Russia alone from 1985 to 
1998. It is evident that the CIS-countries have experienced a more negative 
economic development than the countries of CEE and B.  
 
Figure 1. GDP at market price in 1995 US$10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7 See for example Koechlin (1992). 
8 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
9 Source: (Easterly and Yu 1999). 
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Milanovic (1998) states that the estimated poverty headcount has increased in 
all countries from 1987/88 to 1993/95. The greatest changes occurred in the 
CIS where the poverty headcount on average for the countries included were 
above 50 percent in 1993/5. Romania is the only CEE country to have such a 
high percentage.11 In the case of Georgia the Gini coefficient rose from 0.3 in 
1989/90 to 0.5 in 1995/97 (EBRD 1999m). The greatest change, from 0.15 to 
0.4, occurred in Romania.  
 The overall wage inequality nearly doubled in Russia from 1991-1994 
(Brainerd 1998). Several studies analysing the effects of the transition on 
income inequality and changes in wage structures have been conducted. In 
Poland and the Czech Republic evidence suggests that returns to education 
increased whereas the returns to experience fell during transition (Flanagan 
1995;Rutkowski 1996;Vecernik 1995). Due to unique pension policies 
reducing the labour supply of experienced workers, returns both to education 
and experience increased in Slovenia (Orazem and Vodopivec 1995). Returns 
to education and experience both fell however in East Germany after 
reunification (Krueger and Pischke 1995). Despite an increase in returns to 
both measured (education and occupation) and unmeasured skills within 
groups, the skill premiums between groups became more compressed during 
Russia’s transition. Wages of older workers have declined, as have female 
relative to male wages. Young educated males, acquiring new skills relevant to 
the new economy and taking advantage of the opportunities materialising in 
the new private sector, appear to be the winners. Older workers on the other 
hand have experienced a devaluation of their human capital and have fewer 
incentives to acquire new skills (Brainerd 1998).  
 The new economic environment that materialised encouraged individuals 
to seek alternative careers. You will thus find scientists driving taxies, 
engineers selling tourist souvenirs or finding employment abroad when 
possible. These phenomena are referred to as internal and external brain 
drain, the former posing a greater threat to the human capital of the nation 
than the second (Fan, et al. 1997;Kuznetsov 1999).  
                                                                                                                           
10 Source: (World Bank 2000). 
11 Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan is not included. 
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The former Soviet Republics have experienced a rather dramatic 
decrease in life expectancy since 1990. In Russia male life expectancy at birth 
was 57.6 years in 1994, having fallen by 6.2 years since 1990.12 The Russian 
gender differential in life expectancy of 13.6 years in 1994 was the highest in 
the World. From 1989 to 1994 there was a 50 percent increase in deaths from 
cardiovascular disease. External causes of death such as accidents, injuries, 
poisoning and violence increased by 150 percent and there was a dramatic 
increase in deaths from preventable diseases such as tuberculosis, bronchitis, 
pneumonia and dysentery (Becker and Bloom 1998). Walberg (1998) 
concludes that the increasing rates of death between the ages of 30 and 60 
years accounted for most of the fall in life expectancy for both men and 
women. There also appeared to be great geographical differentials, where the 
northern and eastern industrial regions and the large cities of the centre and 
north-west of Russia experienced a steeper increase in mortality rates than did 
the agricultural regions of the south. The study concluded that the main 
factors contributing to the decline in life expectancy was directly or indirectly 
associated with heavy alcohol consumption.13 Shkolnikov (1995a;1995b) 
compare the trend in Russian mortality after the 1960s with the trends in 
France, England and Wales. He concludes that the increasing gap between 
Russia and the other two countries is largely due to diverging trends in 
mortality from cardio-vascular diseases.   
 
“It takes 50 000 US$ to stall a criminal 
investigation in Moscow.” (Wolosky 2000). 
1.2.2 Crime and corruption 
There has been an increased extent of organised crime, corruption and 
unofficial economy in Russia and other economies in transition. These are all 
factors that may deter foreign presence.14  
                                            
12 Leon, et al. (1997) concludes that the fluctuations in mortality are for real, and not an 
artefact. 
13 One of the effects of the anti-alcohol policy instituted by Gorbachev during 1985-1987 was 
a two-year increase in life expectancy. Once the campain collapsed in 1987 decline in life 
expectancy resumed and fell from 69.9 inn 1989 to 64 in 1995.  
14 See for example Lankes and Stern (1998). 
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 Earlier the unofficial economy was believed to improve the efficiency of 
the Soviet economy. The population relied on an extensive network to obtain 
products that “in principle” did not exist. Today, the unofficial economy has 
developed into mafia activities and is less benevolent. Consequences of 
unofficial economic activity may be too little investment, poor use of recourses 
(due to the need of hiding) and lost tax revenues for the government. Johnson 
(1997) estimated the size of the unofficial economy to be 15 percent of GDP in 
Poland and 50 percent of GDP in Russia and the Ukraine. The size of the 
unofficial economy today and the incentives for over-reporting during 
command economy may be two of the reasons why official numbers show 
such a poor economic performance. Also Johnson (1999) based on a survey 
including a sample of about 300 private firms in each of the countries Russia, 
Ukraine Poland, Slovakia and Romania found that the size of unofficial 
activity was much larger in Russia and the Ukraine. In these two countries, 90 
percent of the respondents thought that it was common to pay for protection. 
The results were 14 in Slovakia, 8 in Poland and 1 in Romania. The 
respondents were also asked to state how large a percentage of sales were not 
reported to the government. In Russia 29 percent went unreported, while the 
numbers for Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Romania were 41, 5, 7 and 6 
percent respectively. The increased extent of organised crime and unofficial 
economy may have been caused by the lack of a legal and regulatory 
framework needed for the functioning of a market economy.  
 Public services that should be free of charge are not because the persons 
performing the services ask for payment. In a situation where the economy is 
not functioning and outstanding wages become more common, people depend 
upon alternative sources of income.15  
 Corruption is frequently referred to as a serious deterrent to FDI. 
Campos et al. (1999) concludes that not only the level, but also the 
predictability of corruption matters. That is, if the bribe payer gets what he 
pays for, corruption will not be as damaging to FDI as if the outcome of 
paying a bribe is uncertain. The Corruption Perception Index 1999 included 
                                            
15 More than 40 percent of the working age adults were owed back pay in 1994 and 1995, in 
1996 the percentage had risen to 50 percent,(Zohoori, et al. 1998). 
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all CEEC16 countries but Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. A high score indicates 
less corruption, the index running from 1 to 10. As can be seen from figure 2, 
Slovenia had the lowest perceived level of corruption and Azerbaijan the 
highest among the CEEC countries.  
 
Figure 2. The perceived level of corruption17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1996 the number of mafia-gangs had reached more than 8,000 in Russia. 
This was ten times as many as the number in 1990 (785) (Dunn 1997). Some 
trademarks of the Russian Mafia are the willingness to use violence, ability to 
operate abroad and type of activity it is involved in. The Russian Mafia 
controls an estimated number of 50,000 enterprises and may account for as 
much as 50 percent of GDP (Dunn 1997). Many of the participants in the 
privatisation process had their origin in the shadow economy that existed 
during the Soviet period. Voronin (1997, pg. 55) states: “The distinctive 
features of contemporary Russian organized crime is its inseparable 
connection with phenomena of past Soviet life, especially the shadow 
economy.”  There are close connections between big business and politics in 
Russia today, the most prominent oligarchs being Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail 
Khodorovsky, Roman Abramovich and Mikhail Fridman.  
                                            
16 CEE, B and CIS. 
17 Source: The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Transparency International (1999).  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A
lb
an
ia
B
ul
ga
ri
a
C
ro
at
ia
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
.
H
un
ga
ry
M
ac
ed
on
ia
Po
la
nd
R
om
an
ia
Sl
ov
ak
 R
ep
.
Sl
ov
en
ia
E
st
on
ia
L
at
vi
a
L
ith
ua
ni
a
A
rm
en
ia
A
ze
rb
ai
ja
n
B
el
ar
us
G
eo
rg
ia
K
az
ak
hs
ta
n
K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
M
ol
do
va
R
us
si
a
U
kr
ai
ne
U
zb
ek
is
ta
n
T
he
 1
99
9 
C
PI
 s
co
re
C M I  
 12
 
“Interros-Neft owned by Potanin acquired control over Sidanko (oil company) for 
$130 million, selling 10percent to British Petroleum for $571 million. It is common 
to force the oil producing companies to sell to parent companies at below-market 
price. Then a portion is resold on the world market. Asset stripping has also 
victimised major international oil companies. Friedmans Tyumen Oil Company 
(TNK) allegedly stole Sidankos most valuable assets by manipulating the bankruptcy 
process. Sidanko shareholders included BP Amoco. BP Amoco also suffered a loss of 
at least 100 mill US$ after being forced out of the Priobskoye oil field (largest 
undeveloped oilfield in Russia) by Khodorkovskys Yuganskneftegaz.” (Wolosky 
2000).  
Capital flight poses a serious problem to the economies in transition. The 
problem is particularly pronounced in Russia were it has been estimated at 5 
percent of GDP a year from 1994 to 1997 (Abalkin and Whalley 1999), FDI 
corresponding to less that 1 percent a year for that same period.18 
 Problems faced by business in the region include swindles and piracy. 
This may be a more pronounced problem to foreign firms, as their brands are 
often more expensive and there might a higher demand. In a study involving 
22 of their brand names The Brand Protection Group19 found that piracy had 
cost them $473 million in lost sales in 1999 in Russia alone (the fakes were 
found to have a market share of about 8.5 percent). According to James 
Balaschak20, the Russian government missed out on at least $174 million in 
uncollected taxes on those goods. This amount equals just less than 1 percent 
of the country’s 1999 tax-collection (McChesney 2000). 
According to Voronin (1997) the Russian economy has become dependent 
upon illegal rather than legal activities. As a consequence most new capitalists 
exist in a grey area between the unofficial and the official world. Lief (1999) 
in his study of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine concludes: ”Even if 
businesspeople tried to be honest, in the four countries the team visited, it 
would be difficult to do because of a tangle of regulations and constantly 
changing government decrees and legislation.”   
1.3  Progress in transition 
                                            
18 Several attempts have been made at estimating the size of capital flight. However, as there is 
dispute as to the definition of capital flight and data are difficult to obtain it has proved 
difficult (Sheets 1995). Loukine (1998) refer estimates varying from 10 to 30 billion US$ a 
year.  
19 Consisting of 12 menbers, among which are Nestlï, Procter & Gamble and Philip Morris. 
20 Deputy general director of law firm Deloitte & Touche, which conducted the study. 
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CEE and B appear to be more successful both in their transition towards 
marked economies and towards democracy than the CIS. The development of 
transition indicators from 1994-1998 is depicted in figure 3, as is the 
relationship between progress in transition and Freedom Rating (FR) in 1998-
99. 
 Progress in transition is represented by the average Transition Indicator 
(TRI) developed by the EBRD. Progress is measured against standards of 
industrialised market economies and the scale runs from 1 to 4. The value 1 
implies that little change has been made and the value 4 implies closeness to 
the standards of industrialised market economies. The correlation between the 
average TRI in 1999 and the average FR 1998-99 was 0.88 suggesting a 
positive relationship between progress in transition and political development.  
 
Figure 3. Progress in transition and freedom rating 
 
Since 1972, the Freedom House has published annual assessments of freedom 
in different countries. The assessments are made by averaging political rights 
and civil liberties. Countries whose ratings average 1.0 - 2.5 are generally 
considered "Free", countries with average ratings between 3.0 - 5.5 are 
considered "Partly Free" and average ratings between 5.5 – 7.0 imply the 
country should be assessed as "Not Free".21  
 Progress in transition may serve as a proxy for the stability of the regime. 
The issue of political stability as a positive determinant of foreign direct 
investments has been examined in several empirical studies. Political stability 
                                            
21 http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/.  
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may be measured by a number of indexes or time dummies identifying periods 
of relative calm or unrest.  The empirical results on political instability as a 
deterrent to investment has varied according to both sample and proxy for 
instability.22  
                                            
22 The variance in results according to choice of proxy and countries examined has been 
addressed both by Brunetti and Weder (1997) and Sing and Jun (1995). 
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2  Theoretical background 
After examining somewhat closer which effects FDI is believed to have on the 
host economy, prevailing theoretical contributions to the study of 
international production are presented. The selection of possible determinants 
of FDI for further empirical testing is based on theoretical contributions 
reviewed in this section and previous empirical findings presented in chapter 3.  
2.1 Host country impact 
There is a common perception of FDI as an important factor in the transition 
process contributing to the restructuring of enterprises and the transfer of 
capital and know-how (IMF, et al. 1991). The inflow of foreign capital may 
help increase the aggregate investment rate and thus the overall level of 
activity in the economy. It may also exhibit a signalling effect as to the 
soundness of the economy.23 Piatkin (1993) especially emphasises the potential 
of FDI to relieve social tensions in addition to the benefits of having foreign 
production of food and consumer goods, produced locally, replace import.  
The standard theory of international trade and the theory of industrial 
organisation both provide theoretical frameworks for studying the effects of 
FDI on host countries. Emphasising different aspects of capital movements, 
the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Whereas trade theorists have 
focused on the direct effects of FDI on factor rewards, employment and capital 
flows, the industrial organisation approach put emphasis on the indirect 
effects (externalities). Externalities are encountered in relation to the transfer 
and diffusion of technology and knowledge and to changes in the market 
structure and degree of competition in the host countries. However, it is likely 
that the extent to which FDI will enhance the transfer of technology depend 
upon the strategy of both the local authorities and the foreign investor. Local 
government may demand or encourage the development of local skills, and the 
strategy of the multinational corporation (MNC) determines to which extent it 
                                            
23 For more on host country effects from FDI see for example Blomström and Kokko (1997).  
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will integrate into the local community. Large MNCs are known to adjust 
their technology to the localisation using different technologies in different 
locations. Technology transfers are more likely to take place once the 
technological level at any location is similar to the level of technology at the 
MNC affiliate. MNCs may choose to exploit the existing advantages and 
move on as these are eroded (UNCTAD 1999). MNCs entering the market 
may force local firms to reduce slack in the organisation (x-inefficiency). There 
may be job creation, added tax revenues and a supply of foreign currency 
associated with the presence of MNCs. When they produce for the local 
market MNCs are more likely to purchase inputs from local firms. As 
suppliers to MNC affiliates, local business may more easily reach the global 
market.24 However, foreign presence may also be beneficial to local firms by 
increasing business opportunities and develop strong linkages or making 
factor markets more efficient. These benevolent effects are more likely to 
occur when FDI concentrates in undeveloped industries.  
 However, FDI may also exhibit negative effects such as the out-crowding 
of local industry increasing concentration rather than promoting competition 
in the long run. The development of local enterprise is of high priority to 
developing countries, making the crowding out of local industry a frequent 
issue of concern. Crowding out due to FDI may occur in both the product and 
factor market. Competition from foreign enterprises in the product market 
may prevent local enterprises from undertaking lengthy and costly learning 
processes. A reduction in the availability or increase in the costs of finance and 
other factors may be the outcome of foreign presence. As a consequence of 
reputation and size, local affiliates of MNCs may have privileged access to 
both finance and skilled personnel.  There is also the danger of weak 
bargaining and regulatory capabilities on behalf of host countries resulting in 
an unequal distribution of benefits or abuse of market power by MNCs.   
 The impact of FDI on host economies may differ depending on the mode 
and motive for entry on behalf of the MNCs. Special concern has been raised 
as to the effect of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as opposed to greenfield 
                                            
24 Nordås et al. (2000) explore the potential for local SADC enterprises participation in global 
production networks or supply chains. 
C M I  
 17
(new) investment. These concerns, being expressed both in developed and 
developing countries are caused by some special features of M&A. These, do 
not raise employment to the same degree as would greenfield investments. On 
the contrary, M&As may imply lay-off and/or the closing of some production 
and functional activities. These may include headquarters and research and 
development departments. The taking over of existing activity rather than 
establishing new also imply M&As will not immediately add to aggregated 
productivity. Strategic action to reduce competition in the host market, 
threatening local entrepreneurial and technological capacity building. Also, the 
transfer of ownership from domestic to foreign hands may not be appealing. 
Concerns are economic, cultural, political and social. M&As may also reduce 
rather than enhance local competition once it takes place as part of an 
aggressive strategy to impede domestic competition.  
2.2 Determinants of FDI inflow 
The two main streams of literature explaining international production are 
rooted in the theory of industrial organisation and the theory of international 
trade respectively. The former initiated by Hymer (1960), the second by 
Vernon (1966). Recognising the specific characteristics of FDI, later research 
has focused on (1) the location of production, (2) the sources of firm 
(ownership) specific advantages and (3) the reasons for integrating different 
business units in one firm. Three attempts at explaining the activities of MNCs 
were made in the mid-1970s. Both the internalisation theory of MNCs and the 
electic paradigm are micro-economic or behavioural explanations. The macro 
theory of FDI seeks to explain which activities are best undertaken in different 
countries rather than analyse the why of engagement by MNCs. Other recent 
contributions to the study of international trade and production include the 
integration of MNC into trade models and the rediscovery of economic 
geography.  
Being the first to distinguish between portfolio and direct investments 
Hymer (1960) focused on the difference in terms of control by investor and in 
development over time. The decision to engage in FDI was determined by the 
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firm-specific advantages of the firm, and hence primed by market 
imperfection. Internalisation implying elimination of competition was 
identified as a factor that would encourage FDI (as an alternative to tacit 
collusion). Diversification was also promoted as a motive for FDI as the profit 
in activities may be inversely correlated to the profit related to other activities. 
He found that investments would be concentrated in certain industries across 
countries rather than in countries across industries.  Essentially an extension 
of the neo-classical trade theory, Vernon (1966) developed a theory for FDI 
based on the product cycle. He focused on the prospect for cutting costs by 
locating the production in low-cost countries. The need for cutting costs 
would arise as production standardised, imitation became easier and 
competition sharpened. Based on the insights of these early works several 
strands of research have developed.25 
 Internalisation theory explains the emergence of MNC as a result of 
market failures. The market failures, which exist prior to the engagement in 
international production, give rise to ownership specific advantages. These 
advantages are thus exogenous to the firm. A static approach, the basic 
hypothesis states that enterprises will engage in FDI once the transaction costs 
associated with external trading of intermediate products exceed the cost of 
internalisation (Buckley and Casson 1976;Caves 1971;McManus 
1972;Swedenborg 1979). Engagement in international production may also 
cause market failures and ownership specific advantages, and thus be 
considered strategic actions aimed at creating or exploiting market failures 
rather than overcome them (Buckley and Casson 1985;1988;Buckley and 
Casson 1991). Another line of research, the “Uppsala school” focuses on the 
gradual increase in international involvement by enterprises (Johanson and 
Vahlne 1977;1990). The country specific knowledge of an enterprise will 
enable the recognition of business opportunities and reduce market insecurity. 
Such knowledge can only be achieved through experience and active 
                                            
25 There are also other approaches not directly related to the two main streams attempting to 
explain MNE activity, and thus identify the determinants of FDI. Examples are the risk 
diversification hypothesis (Agmon and Lessard 1977) and the macro-financial and exchange 
rate theories (Aliber 1970;Frost and J.C. 1989). See Dunning (1993) and Meyer (1998a) for 
comprehensive surveys of the literature. 
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involvement. Thus, previous resource commitment, at a foreign location, and 
the resulting country specific knowledge determine the current engagement of 
the enterprise. This view of internationalisation of enterprises has three 
important implications (Meyer 1998a). First, firms will follow a sequence 
from a low to a higher mode of involvement. Second, firms first enter new 
markets that are close in terms of “psychic distance”.  Psychic distance 
includes the geographical, cultural, political and linguistic distance between 
the home and host economy.  Third, the initial investment in a new location 
may serve the function of accumulating experience and knowledge or develop 
brand loyalty with customers.  
The electic paradigm provided by Dunning (1977) integrates many 
theories into a general, electic paradigm. Within this framework FDI is 
undertaken provided three conditions are fulfilled. The MNC has some 
specific ownership advantage as compared to the domestic/local firm making 
it more competitive. There has to be a location advantage of producing in the 
foreign country rather than producing at home for export. There also has to 
be some internalisation advantage. The ownership advantage may be referred 
to as the “why” of MNC activity, location advantage the “where” of 
production, and incentives to internalise the “how” of involvement. The 
electic paradigm argues that two kinds of market imperfections must be 
present. Structural market failure discriminates between firms in their ability 
to gain and sustain control over property rights or to govern multiple and 
geographically dispersed value-added activities. Failure of intermediate 
product markets to transact goods and services at a lower net cost than within 
the enterprise also has to incur. Dunning (1993) identifies four main types of 
MNC activity; resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking and 
strategic asset or capability seeking. The resource seeking enterprises invest 
abroad to acquire particular and specific resources (physical resources, well 
motivated skilled or semi-skilled labour and technological capability) at a 
lower real cost than could be obtained in their home country. Market seekers 
invest in a region or country to supply goods or services to markets in these or 
adjacent countries. The efficiency seekers wishes to rationalise the structure of 
established resource based or market seeking investments in such a way that 
C M I  
 20
the investing company can gain from common governance of geographically 
dispersed activities. That is to exploit economies of scale and diversify risk. 
Strategic asset seekers usually engage in FDI by acquiring the assets of foreign 
corporations to promote their long-term strategic objectives. These may be to 
sustain or advance the international competitiveness. Increasingly, strategic 
and rationalising investments go hand in hand. An overview of the OLI 
advantages for each type MNC activity is provided in Dunning (1993, table 
4.2, 4.3). Determinants of foreign activity will thus depend upon the type of 
activity an enterprise seeks to engage in. 
 The macro theory of FDI compares the costs and benefits of producing 
in different locations. At a macro-economic level, the FDI flow of a firm can 
be considered a function of the desired capital stock in a given foreign 
location, or rather the difference between the desired stock of capital at time t, 
given the actual stock at time t-1. The desired capital stock depends upon the 
profitability of the firm. The profitability of production in any specific 
location in turn depends upon the general level of technological development, 
the level of human and the more general business environment. This includes 
political instability (risk), liberalisation, privatisation, taxes (including 
corruption). As FDI is generally considered irreversible, these flows are 
sensitive to changes in the economic environment and to uncertainty. Changes 
in the environment change the flow of FDI temporarily while MNCs adjust to 
the new level of desired stock of foreign holdings. Reaching a new level may 
be associated with substantial adjustment costs, implying time lags driving a 
wedge between the desired and actual stock of FDI. Anticipated as well as real 
changes can influence the choice of desired stock and thereby the changes in 
FDI flow. Temporary changes may inhibit long-run implications for the stock 
of FDI due to the path dependence of the economy and the phenomenon of 
hysterisis. “The failure of investment decisions to reverse themselves when the 
underlying causes are fully reversed can be called economic hysterisis” (Dixit 
1994, pg. 17). After having entered the market and undertaken sunk costs an 
enterprise will not necessarily withdraw immediately following a negative 
change in profitability. Considering the exit option (disinvestment) of a firm, 
its optimal investment decision is characterised by two thresholds. A sufficient 
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rate of return to enter the market and a sufficient loss to justify exit from the 
market. When the current profitability lies between these two the decision to 
become operative or not will depend upon the recent history. Once 
profitability passes the upper threshold the firm invests. Empirical evidence 
suggests firms will not invest until expected returns are four times the capital 
costs (Dixit 1994, pg. 17). Should profitability fall back to its former level, not 
crossing the lower boundary this would not warrant the exit of the enterprise 
from the market.  
The neo-classical theory of international trade can explain issues 
related to FDI only by dropping the assumption of perfect competition 
(Brainard 1993;Horstmann and Markusen 1992;Markusen and Venables 
1998). The new trade theory (industrial organisation approach to trade) 
represented by Markusen (1998) allows for MNCs to arise endogenously. 
MNCs are found to hold an advantage over national enterprises when the 
overall market is large (world income is high), markets are similar in size 
(countries are similar in income) and relative factor endowments, firm level 
economics of scale are large relative to plant-level economics of scale and 
transportation costs are high.  
Agglomeration of economic activity is studied within the framework of 
economic geography (Krugman 1992;Krugman and Venables 1994). Fixed 
costs within the industry, regional dispersion of markets and costs of 
transportation determine industry-concentration. Thus, industrial structure 
appears to be a major determinant of inward FDI. For example, banks and 
consultants are traditionally believed to follow their customers upon entering 
new markets. However once established these also provide services to other 
investors. Suppliers and a technologically specialised work force may act as 
comparative advantages to related firms and competitors (Silicon Valley). This 
would warrant a strategic asset or capacity building type of investments as 
described by Dunning (1993). 
 The review of these theoretical contributions provides a framework for 
our empirical study. At an early stage FDI in the newly opened economies, 
may be expected to originate in countries in close psychic distance. The mode 
and level of investment will start at a low level and increase over time as 
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companies acquire more knowledge on these markets. The study is performed 
at an aggregate level assessing the costs and benefits of operating in different 
countries. Factors such as the level of technology, of human capital and the 
business environment are suggested to be important determinants for FDI. 
Industrial structure may also influence the FDI pattern, and the importance of 
different determinants of FDI varies by motive. These insights are combined 
with findings from earlier empirical studies to provide hypothesises for testing 
in chapter 5.  
C M I  
 23
3  Previous empirical findings  
First, results from studies on the impact of FDI are reported. Then follows a 
presentation of previous work on determinants of FDI in the region. 
Hypothesises for empirical testing are derived based on the theoretical 
framework presented earlier and empirical findings presented here.  
3.1 Impact 
For CEEC, the inflow of FDI is suggested to have improved management of 
technical change, sourcing, marketing and training, and capability 
enhancement. New products have been introduced and “old” products have 
been upgraded and assimilated to Western standards. Foreign presence has 
made an impact in terms of automation and packaging, rationalisation of 
existing production lines and introduction of new technologies. It has also 
been suggested that FDI has made an impact in terms of market-extension 
(subcontracting) and increased productivity and quality as investing firms 
insist on “helping” subcontractors cut costs and fulfil the specifications 
imposed (Dyker 1999).  
FDI as percentage of GDP might give an idea as to the relative 
importance of foreign investment in the economy. Averaging over the period 
(1994-1998) five countries receive FDI the equivalent of less than one percent 
of GDP. These are all CIS group countries (Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan).  In 1997 Azerbaijan received FDI at a level close to 
29 percent of GDP. Averaging over the period, Azerbaijan is the largest 
receiver of FDI (17) followed by Estonia (6), Latvia (5.7), Hungary (5.2) and 
Kazakhstan (5) the rest receiving less than four percent of GDP. However, 
high FDI rates as compared to GDP are not a prerequisite for growth. Among 
the four most successful NIC’s (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan) only Hong Kong and Singapore has had a high FDI percentage of 
gross fixed capital formation.26 
                                            
26 Source: (UNCTAD 1999). 
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Enterprise restructuring is of vital importance to the transition from planned 
to market economy. Evidence suggests that whereas domestic firms do 
undertake passive restructuring such as the downsizing of employment, 
foreign ownership imply strategic restructuring in terms of new products and 
production facilities, marketing and entry into new markets (Carlin 
1995;Djankov 1999;Djankov and Pohl 1998;Estrin 1995;Estrin, et al. 1997). 
Provided there is active restructuring of an enterprise, foreign ownership 
positively affects the probability of undertaking training by the employees 
(Berger 2000).  
Radosevic (1999) concludes that most often, new production and 
innovation networks in the CEE are foreign-led. Considering the impact of 
FDI on market relationships in terms of networks and enterprise 
transformation. Meyer (1998c) studies the production network of Skoda. In 
April 1991 the Czechoslovakian government chose Volkswagen to be the 
foreign partner of Skoda. Following their partnership, Skoda is said to have 
pressured its local suppliers to link with Western partners and VW to urge its 
global suppliers to invest in the Czech Republic. Since 1991 about 50 Czech 
and Slovak suppliers have formed joint ventures or been acquired by 
established multinational automotive suppliers, whereas 20 foreign firms 
engaged in greenfield investments. The first tier suppliers to Skoda are usually, 
at least in part, foreign owned. The second tier suppliers are locally owned 
enterprises which failed to attract foreign investors, and thus to a lesser extent 
benefit from technological transfers. They are the most vulnerable partners in 
the network. VW imposed tough requirements for cost and quality, and 
worked closely with suppliers to help them achieve the required standards. 
The Octavia, released in 1996, was actually built in a new production plant 
based on global VW supply chain management. Following the entry of VW 
the Czech automotive industry has been exposed to competition by worldwide 
research and production networks as Skoda imports intermediates from VW 
affiliates and suppliers abroad. However, some local Czech suppliers have also 
become global suppliers of VW. 
The expanding use of barter, particularly in the CIS but also in CEEB, 
has been referred to as one of the most puzzling paradoxes of the transition. In 
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1997 more than 40 percent of all taxes paid to the Russian federal government 
were made in non-monetary form (Gaddy and Ickes 1998b) and by 1996 the 
percentage of the working age adults that were owed back pay had risen to 50 
(Zohoori, et al. 1998).27 The share of barter in industrial sales in Russia 
increased from under 20 percent in 1995 to around 50 percent in 1998 
(Aukutsionek 1998).28 The use of barter is associated with little or lack of 
enterprise restructuring (Carlin 2000;Commander and Mumssen 1998;Estrin 
and Rosevear 1999;Gaddy and Ickes 1998a;Makarov and Kleiner 1997), 
whereas foreign ownership is. This may imply that foreign owned enterprises 
are more reluctant to involve in (and less dependent upon) barter transactions. 
Barter networks thus may act as a deterrent to FDI inflow.  
 Having stated some potential advantages and disadvantages associated 
with foreign presence we will now move on to identifying the determinants 
and structure of FDI inflow.  
3.2 Determinants 
There appeared to be quite a few a priori reasons for investing in the former 
socialist economies, at the outset of transition.29 Earlier, customers had little 
access to consumer goods and brands that were available in other countries at 
similar per capita income. Due to the high western media penetration, 
European and American products enjoyed a very high status (e.g. 
McDonalds), implying possible brand loyalty even prior to the introduction of 
the product. From a strategic point of view, penetration of these new markets 
would help sustain or enhance the global position. Also, governments in 
general encourage foreign investments to upgrade telecom, power generation 
and distribution and transportation infrastructure.  
 Market access has been identified as the prime motive for entering 
emerging markets in several surveys. Low labour costs and an educated labour 
force however, does not appear to play any significant role in attracting 
                                            
27 In 1996, Chelyabins Oblast, the monthly benefit for dependent children in the “Agrokalibr” 
association was four bottles of vodka (Makarov and Kleiner 1997). 
28 Estimates on the scope of barter vary from 20-90 percent of total volume of industrial 
output (Makarov and Kleiner 2000).  
29 (see cha. 1.1 pp 3-4).  
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foreign participation. Neither does the availability of natural resources. This 
however, may be due to the fact that surveys have concentrated on CEE and 
the western parts of the former USSR where resources are not as important. 
Also each investment project is considerable in size, but the number of projects 
may be low. Foreign investors are attracted by a transparent tax system, rather 
than tax incentives. Major obstacles reported are political and economic 
instability, poor physical and institutional infrastructure and problems with 
the bureaucratic administration in addition to the legal and regulatory policy.30    
”The Federal Treaty of Russia allows the constituent parts of Russia to enter into 
agreements and treaties with foreign entities as long as they do not contradict the Russian 
constitution. They may also participate independently in foreign trade (import and export a 
variety of raw materials and manufactured products) without obtaining permission from 
central ministries. By 1996 each region had signed an average of 20 trade agreements with 
foreign countries, with some co-operating with firms from more than 100 nations. Regional 
administrations also have passed legislation to promote foreign investment in specific 
locations.” (Nunn and Stulberg 2000).  
The relative importance of access to markets as a major motivation for 
investment was noted in one of the earliest surveys presented in Collins and 
Rodrik (1991). The survey was conducted on a sample of 54 larger companies 
operating in the USSR in the winter of 1990-91.  Market potential and first-
mover advantage were the most commonly reported motivations for entering 
Russia. Some also reported the proximity to the European Community as a 
motivating factor. In line with later surveys, little importance was attached to 
the level of human capital and low labour costs. Major obstacles were political 
and economic instability alongside the lack of protection for private property. 
Lankes and Stern (1998) refer a survey presented at the EBRD annual meeting 
in 1997. As enterprises engaged in business worldwide were asked to give their 
assessment as to which were the most severe obstacles for doing business the 
survey allowed a comparison of regions. Corruption and high 
taxes/regulations were deemed as the major deterrent by 80 percent of the 
respondents, followed by policy instability (52), crime and theft (48), and 
lastly costs of regulations (44) in the case of CIS. The order of obstacles being 
the same as in the case of developing countries, a higher percentage of the 
respondents considered each obstacle more severe in the case of the CIS.  
                                            
30 For an overview of surveys see (EBRD 1994;Meyer 1998c). 
C M I  
 27
Part of the legal and regulatory problems faced by foreign investors 
could be attributed to the inconsistent publication of laws and regulations 
combined with reluctance on part of the officials to put anything in writing, 
fearing that it would backfire. It has also been suggested that the existence of 
separate spheres of law (relationship, substantive and bureaucratic) makes 
“who one knows” more important than what the law actually says (Thornton 
and Mikheeva 1996). The need for knowledge about the system and contact 
with key personnel promoted the use of local partners upon entering the 
market (McCarthy and Puffer 1997).  
In spite of a general perception of low labour costs as an unimportant factor 
in attracting FDI, surveys suggest human capital may attract foreign 
investments in Hungary (Szanyi 1998) and Russia (McCarthy and Puffer 
1997). However, there appears to have been a severe deterioration of human 
capital accompanying the transition (Clarce and Metalina 2000). Some 
surveys do report the availability of natural resources as motivating factors 
(Maurseth 1997;McCarthy and Puffer 1997). Looking closer at the 
distribution of FDI between the Russian regions Brock (1998) found the flow 
of FDI to be relatively larger where markets were larger, risk and crime were 
lower. Once the two cities Moscow and Saint Petersburg were excluded cheap 
labour was not a significant determinant. Meyer (1998b) reports that only five 
of the 229 enterprises included in his survey gave low labour costs as their 
only motive for investing. Most investors caring about labour costs also cared 
for the potential of the market. Enterprises involved in machine manufacturing 
were to a greater extent paying attention to the labour costs (41 percent) than 
enterprises in the chemical industry (19 percent). Small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME) from neighbouring countries operating within certain 
industries such as textiles; clothing, furniture and musical instrument are to a 
greater extent than others attracted by lower factor costs (Meyer 2000).  
Lankes and Venables (1996) found a positive correlation between the 
average TRI in 1995 and accumulated FDI that same year (0.65). Upon 
differentiating enterprises seeking new markets (horizontal), and those seeking 
to reduce production costs (vertical), they conclude that countries that have 
progressed in terms of transition attract relatively more of the second type, 
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than those that have not reached as far in the transition process. Differences 
between countries in terms of locational advantages thus suggest a role for the 
distinction types of investors made by Dunning (1993). Lankes and Stern 
(1998) claim that FDI is driven by the progress in transition, unleashing the 
potential of the countries (human capital, natural resources and geographical 
situation). Thus, whereas FDI early in the transition process was about 
entering the new market, the FDI attracted will be of a more integrated type as 
the country progress. First mover advantage will be more important to 
market-seeking investors, whereas efficiency-seeking investors depend upon 
higher stability in order to lower their production costs.  
In 1997 fewer than 40 foreign mine companies were active in the Central 
Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
combined (Clark and Naito 1998).31 Reported obstacles for involvement in the 
mineral sector coincide with other findings. They arise due to lack of a 
comprehensive legal framework and experience in dealing with foreign mining 
corporations and their practices. Problems faced include a high rate of 
turnover in senior government positions making negotiations difficult and 
increasing the need for renegotiations, a lack of transparency in the decision 
making process resulting in delays and uncertainty, a lack of contractual 
security, favouritism of domestic companies and corruption. Corruption 
increases exponentially upon approaching development and construction 
activities. Other obstacles include the fundamental differences between the 
soviet (technological) and western (economic) classification of reserves, failure 
to recognise the fundamental difference between the quality and value of 
resources in the ground and reserves, traditional separation of responsibility 
for various geologic and mining related activities between and within agencies.  
 Given the theoretical framework, previous results imply two 
hypothesises that warrant empirical testing: 1) foreign activity in CIS is 
primarily of a market seeking and resource seeking character; 2) foreign 
activity in CEEB is increasingly of an efficiency seeking character. This is done 
                                            
31 This is fewer than in Indonesia or the Philippines individually. Based on risk weighted with 
respect to the geological potential the ranking of the four counties in terms of most attractive 
to foreign involvement were found to be Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
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in chapter 5, following and account of the actual inflow that has been 
registered to the CEEC since 1994 in chapter 4.  
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4  The recorded inflow  
“Slovakia’s government …. Also plans to change 
Slovakia’s image as a sometimes difficult, non-
transparent place to do business to a country 
doing whatever it takes to attract western 
companies committed to investing over the long 
run.” (EBRD 1999i, pg. 16). 
 
Most FDI flows between developed countries, which accounted for more than 
60 percent of world inflow and 90 percent of world outflow of FDI in 1998. 
In absolute terms, the inflow of FDI to the 25 countries included in this study 
has increased from US$7 billion in 1994, exceeding US$20 billion in 1997 and 
1998. However, viewed in light of potential and expectations at the outset of 
transition, the region has received a relatively modest share at about 4 percent 
of world FDI inflow from 1994-1998. In 1997 the share reached an all time 
high of 4.8 percent, dropping to a mere 3.4 percent following the crisis in the 
Russian economy in August 1998. The regions share of world outward FDI 
was 0.3 percent in 1998. The outward-inward ratio being 0.09. Russia stands 
out as the outward-inward ratio increased from 0.16 in 1994 to 0.47 in 1998.  
  
Figure 4. FDI inflow to the region 1994-199832  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distribution of FDI within the region is uneven. The major receiver of FDI 
between 1994 and 1998 in absolute terms is Poland (in excess of 24 percent), 
                                            
32 Source: (UNCTAD 2000). 
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followed by Russia (16), Hungary (14) and the Czech Republic (10). The CEE 
region accounts for as much as 67 percent of the FDI inflow, but only 42 
percent of the total GDP for this period. However, there is a more positive 
trend in terms of GDP growth for this group of countries as compared to the 
CIS. Also, a little less than two thirds of the total population lives in the CIS, 
implying a larger relative market (GDP per capita) in the CEE.  There is also a 
concentration of investments within Russia, where as much as 77 percent of 
FDI in 1997 went to Moscow City. In addition to Moscow Oblast, St. 
Petersburg City and Leningrad Oblast, resource-rich areas like Magadan (gold 
and silver) received around or more than 1 percent. Figure 5 shows the inflow 
of FDI for each country in total and per capita numbers for the period 1994-
1998. 
 
Figure 5. Dispersion of FDI 1994-199833 
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Up until 1996 approximately one third of the accumulated FDI in CEE had 
originated in Germany. Germany figures among the top three source countries 
in eight of the CEE countries, and only four of the fifteen former Soviet 
republics.  
 
Table 1. Source countries. 
Source country Host economy Year 
1 2 3 
Albania b 1996 Italy Greece Na. 
Bulgaria a 1998 Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Germany USA 
Croatia a 1998 USA Austria  Switzerland  
Czech Rep. a 1997 Germany Netherlands Austria  
Hungary a 1997 Germany USA Netherlands 
Macedonia a 1997 Germany Austria  Greece 
Poland a 1997 Netherlands Germany USA 
Romania a 1998 Netherlands Germany France 
Slovakia a 1998 Austria  Germany United Kingdom 
Slovenia a 1997 Austria  Croatia Germany 
Estonia a 1998 Sweden Finland USA 
Latvia a 1998 Denmark USA Russia 
Lithuania a 1998 Sweden Finland USA 
Armenia b 1998 Greece France Canada 
Azerbaijan b 
Most FDI takes place within the oil and gas sector. In 1994 “the deal of the 
century” was signed involving AIOC, dominated by British and American 
influence. The Azeri government is involved along with firms from Russia, 
Turkey, Norway, Japan and Saudi-Arabia. In 1998 six contracts worth 
close to US$17 billion were signed involving Italy, Japan, Spain, Canada, 
UK, USA, Norway. Excluding oil, the US and Turkey are the most 
important investors. 
Georgia b 1998 USA United Kingdom Azerbaijan/Russia 
Byelorussia a 1998 Germany Netherlands USA 
Kazakhstan b 1998 USA Japan Turkey 
Kyrgyzstan b 1998 Canada  Turkey China 
Moldova a 1998 Russia USA Germany 
Russia b 1998 Germany USA France/United 
Kingdom 
Tajikistan b 
Enterprises having made the most significant investments originate in 
Canada, USA, UK, South Korea, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, 
Hungary and Russia. 
Turkmenistan b The latest years more have been invested in the oil- and gas-sector, 
enterprises originating in the US, UK and Malaysia. 
Ukraine a 1998 USA Netherlands Germany 
                                                                                                                           
33 Source: (UNCTAD 2000). 
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Uzbekistan b 1997 United Kingdom Malaysia Turkey 
a. Source: (UNCTAD 1999). 
b. Source: (EBRD 1999a;b;c;e;f;g;h;j;k;l). 
 
There is also a more significant presence of FDI originating in other European 
countries such as the Netherlands and Austria as compared to the former 
Soviet Union (SU). The US is a heavy investor in the former SU figuring among 
the most important source countries in twelve out of the fifteen former 
republics. In the three Baltic States there is a relatively strong Scandinavian 
presence. In the Turkish speaking areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
there is a notable Turkish presence. Asian investments in Central Asia may not 
exceed in size those flowing to CEE, however as compared to other source 
countries there is a greater relative importance. The concentration of FDI thus 
appears to be high both in terms of host and source country.  
 The pattern observed in regard to host and source country of FDI inflow 
is greatly consistent with the predictions of the Uppsala School. Most FDI 
flow from Western Europe to the CEE. These are closer in terms of psychic 
distance than Western Europe and the CIS. Also these countries were in 
general more open than the Soviet Union during the previous socialist period.  
 The developments within the automotive industry in Poland (Fiat, 
Daewoo, General Motors) and the Czech Republic (Volkswagen, Renault, 
Daewoo) in particular supports the hypothesis of industrial structure as a 
major determinant of FDI as suggested within the discipline of economic 
geography.  
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5  Testing the hypotheses  
Based on the theoretical contributions and previous empirical findings two 
hypothesises were suggested for empirical testing in chapter 3. 1) Foreign 
activity in CIS is primarily of a market seeking and resource seeking character; 
2) foreign activity in CEEB is increasingly of an efficiency seeking character. It 
is possible to test these using macro-economic data.  
 Investors seeking market access and resources value a first mover 
advantage more than efficiency seeking investors who are more concerned 
about risk and stability. Assuming that the perceived risk associated with 
investment decreases as countries make progress in terms of transition, seems 
reasonable. Such an assumption implies that upon identifying determinants of 
inward FDI to the regions, the size of the market should be more important in 
CIS whereas the transition indicator would be more important in the case of 
CEEB.  
 Thus, to test the hypothesis, market size and progress in transition have 
to be included in the empirical model. From theory we know that investments 
are assumed to be sensitive to the level of human capital. A combination of 
low wages and a high level of human capital should thus attract vertical 
investments.  Due to data constraints the testing requires two empirical 
specifications:  
 
The basic-models: 
itit
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Definitions of the variables included in the regressions are reported in table 2. 
The first model considers the importance of market size and progress in 
transition. The model is specified in a log-linear form and per capita terms. To 
confirm the hypothesis, GDP and growth in GDP should be significant in CIS, 
whereas the transition indicator should be significant in CEEB. The second 
model evaluates the importance of wage and educational level. Due to high 
correlation between wage and GDP per capita, the model is specified in total 
rather than per capita terms. Also, data on wages only cover the period 1994-
1997, making the number of observations smaller. Significance of the wage 
and educational variables in the CEEB group support the hypothesis stating 
FDI to the region are vertical.  
 
Table 2. List of variables and definitions.34 
Variable Definition 
FDI  Real total foreign direct investment   
fdi   Real foreign direct investment per capita  
GDP   Real gross domestic product  
gdp   Real GDP  per capita 
GG   GDP  growth 
TRI   Transition Indicator  
W  Real wage 
EDUS  General secondary enrolment rate 
EDUT  Tertiary gross enrolment rate 
 
5.1  Methodology 
Data sets combining time-series and cross-sections are called panel or 
longitudinal data sets. As compared to time-series and cross-sectional data 
sets, panel data set provides a larger set of observations thereby increasing the 
number of degrees of freedom as well as reducing collinearity between the 
explanatory variables. Thus, the use of panel data sets improves the efficiency 
                                            
34 Sources: GDP  deflator, population, GDP  and GDP  growth; World Bank (2000), FDI ; 
UNCTAD(1999), TRI ; EBRD (1994;1995;1996;1997;1998), W ; EBRD received by fax Nov. 
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of econometric estimates. Differences across units within the sample that 
cannot be observed and included in the analysis are referred to as unobserved 
heterogeneity. In the case of panel data, heterogeneity across units is an 
integral part of the analysis. The basic assumption of panel data models is 
that: given the observed explanatory variables the effects of all omitted 
variables are driven by individual time-invariant, period individual-invariant 
and individual time-varying variables (Hsiao 1986). Variables varying between 
units being constant across periods may refer to climate, geography, natural 
resources and so forth. The second type of omitted variables may refer to 
external economic shocks occurring at a specific time, affecting all countries in 
the sample.   
 Two basic frameworks are used to analyse panel data sets. These are the 
fixed and random effect assumptions. The fixed effect specification assumes 
that the heterogeneity between countries can be captured by differences in the 
constant term, whereas random effect specifies the country-specific effect as a 
disturbance term. Searching for general answers, making a random selection 
from a larger population, applying the random effect specification is 
preferable. However, here the sample in question is specifically chosen, and 
any results refer only to the countries included. Thus, applying the fixed effect 
assumption is appropriate. The country specific constant terms can be 
modelled by dummy variables: 
ititiiit udy e++= xâ
'
 
 
Thus, ity  is the dependent variable for country i  at time t , id  is a dummy 
variable indicating country i , 'â  is a vector including K  coefficients which are 
to be estimated, itx  is a vector consisting of K  explanatory variables and itå  is 
a disturbance term varying across i  and t . This is usually referred to as the 
least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model. The estimator â  is called the 
within-group estimator as only the variation within each country, as 
deviations from the mean, is utilised in forming the estimator. This implies 
                                                                                                                           
1999 supplemented by (ILO 1998), (IMF 1999) and (Easterly and Yu 1999), EDUS  and 
EDUT : UNICEF (2000). 
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that coefficients for explanatory variables that do not vary over time will not 
be estimated. They will however be included in the country specific term.  
 The rationale for dividing the sample in two groups was tested by 
allowing a dummy-variable distinguishing between the two to interact with 
the explanatory variables, and determine whether the difference in estimated 
coefficients for the two groups are significant. This is done by estimating the 
model: 
tiitiitiiiti DDy ,,, åxãxâ
'' ++++= aj  
 
Then the zero-hyphotesis 0:0 =ãH  is tested against 0:1 ¹ãH . If , 0H  is 
rejected there is reason to divide the sample. The dummy-variable is assigned 
the value 0 for CEEB-group countries and 1 for CIS-group countries. 
The panel used in the analysis is of a rather small size. This should be borne in 
mind as well as taking into consideration the fact that fewer observations 
make it harder to identify correct and significant variables. Even so some 
results do materialise.  
5.2  Results 
The results, reported in table 3, appear to be supportive of the hypothesises 
considering the different types of investments in the CEEB and the CIS.  
  
Table 3. Results from estimation of model (1) 
Dependent 
variable:  
fdi  
Full sample CEEB CIS 
gdpln   3.29*** 
(0.85) 
1.83** 
(0.87) 
1.48 
(1.27) 
-0.67 
(1.83) 
4.73*** 
(1.21) 
4.40*** 
(1.11) 
GG   0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
TRIln   
2.03*** 
(0.52) 
0.90 
(0.56) 
5.64*** 
(1.64) 
1.66 
(2.65) 
1.40** 
(0.58) 
0.66 
(0.57) 
Constant -22.83*** 
(6.24) 
-11.65* 
(6.45) 
-14.18 
(9.22) 
2.22 
(2.60) 
-30.31*** 
(8.23) 
-28.47*** 
(7.49) 
Time  0.22*** (0.05)  
0.21 
(0.12)  
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0 all
 test;-F
:0 =iuH
 
F(24,97)= 
8.32 
F(24,97)= 
8.32 
F(12,49)= 
4.05 
F(12,48)= 
4.22 
F(11,45)= 
12.59 
F(11,45)= 
12.59 
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 within2R  0.3754 0.4643 0.3171 0.3545 0.5510 0.6386 
Number of 
observations, 
T, and 
countries, n. 
T=5 n=25 T=5 n=25 T=5 n=13 T=5 n=13 T=5 n=12 T=5 n=12 
The coefficients are given as well as the standard error in parenthesis. * imply 10 percent level 
of significance, ** imply 5 percent level of significance and *** imply 1 percent level of 
significance 
 
All variables are significant at no less than the five-percent level for the whole 
sample. However, once the time trend is included, growth in GDP and the 
transition indicator lose significance. The average transition indicator varies 
little over time. Also progress in transition will to some extent be time 
dependent. This may in part explain the loss of significance once time is 
included. The F-test on whether all coefficients equal zero is rejected at the 
one-percent level for all models reported in table 3. So is the F-test on whether 
the coefficients of the country specific effects equal zero.  A division of the 
sample is supported by a one-percent level rejection of the zero-hypothesis that 
coefficients for the two groups are the same.  
In the case of CEEB the transition indicator is the only significant explanatory 
variable. In other words, the countries more successful in transition will also 
be more successful in terms of attracting more foreign capital. The investments 
will also be more sensitive to risk than investments in the former Soviet Union. 
There is however correlation between progress in transition and geographical 
position. The most advanced countries in terms of transition are most often 
geographically closer to Western Europe. The fact that geographical position 
is not explicitly controlled for in the regression may lend significance to the 
transition indicator.  
 Investments in CEEB are to a greater extent performed by SME from 
neighbouring countries. Smaller firms, whether market or efficiency seeking 
will probably be more vulnerable to instability and a less friendly business 
environment than the larger multinational companies.  
 An example from Belarus underlines the importance of size and 
bargaining power on behalf of the foreign investor once operating in a new 
market. Having invested US$ 42 million by 1998, Coca-Cola was the largest 
single investor in Belarus. They entered the market as early as 1994 and by 
1995 wished to establish a manufacturing plant. As foreign investors were not 
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allowed to own property this posed a problem, and early in 1996 the Belarus 
Parliament voted in favour of letting Coca-Cola buy a plot of land in Minsk 
(EBRD 1999d). A smaller company would probably not have been able to 
achieve this.  
 FDI in CIS are thus primarily of a market seeking character. Unlike in 
the case of CEEB time seems to matter. Ideally the regression model should 
include a lagged variable (dependent or independent), however due to the 
short time span this was not possible. The importance of time in the regression 
may reflect the increasing knowledge and opening up of these markets to the 
foreign investor. Again, progress in transition is time dependent, and once 
time is included, the transition indicator is no longer a significant determinant 
of FDI in CIS.  
 Richness of resources is not included in this regression.  However, 
according to IMF estimates, between 75-82 percent of total foreign direct 
investments were in the oil and gas industry in Azerbaijan (EBRD 1999c). 
Also, thirty cent of each dollar invested in other parts of the economy was 
related to investments in the oil and gas industry. In cumulative per capita 
terms Kazakhstan which have recorded the highest foreign investment flow in 
the CIS, second only to Azerbaijan.  Here also most investments have been 
directed towards the natural resource sector. By 1998 investments in oil and 
gas accounted for 47.5 percent of total foreign investments since 1993, 
followed by investments in non-ferrous metals at approximately 24.1 percent 
(EBRD 1999f). Thus, the importance of natural resources in attracting foreign 
participation should not be underestimated in case of the resource rich 
countries of the CIS.  
Resource seeking investments do not seem to be particularly sensitive 
neither to progress in transition nor to the level of corruption. Controlling for 
size, FDI per capita and FDI-GDP ratio, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are the 
top receivers of FDI in the CIS. At the same time, Azerbaijan is deemed the 
most corrupt and Kazakhstan the fourth most corrupt of the CIS countries 
according to the 1999 Corruption Perception Index. Belarus on the other hand 
is the least corrupt country in this region. Even so, the investment level is very 
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low. The correlation between the 1999 CPI-score and FDI 1994-1998 for the 
CIS countries is negligible both in total and per capita terms.  
There are several possible explanations. Any index is only able to 
provide an inaccurate description of reality. Also, in the resource rich 
countries investors may be willing to pay for access, whereas they might have 
to be paid in terms of favourable conditions to invest in countries offering 
poorer investment opportunities. Investments in resources may be more 
sensitive to conditions in the world economy than to local determinants. 
Production is export oriented, and prices are determined at the world market. 
As any oil, gas or other extracted resources have to be transported; logistics is 
also of major importance. The lack of infrastructure has for example inclined 
oil companies to withdraw from Azerbaijan. 
 To assess the importance of an educated and low-wage labour force in 
attracting FDI, wage and education level is included in the analysis. The 
smaller sample combined with a larger set of explanatory variables imply less 
degrees of freedom. Again, the F-test on whether all coefficients equal zero is 
rejected at the one-percent level for all models and so is the F-test on whether 
the coefficients of the country specific effects equal zero.   
 As is evident from table 4, including secondary and tertiary education 
and wage to control for low labour cost returns much the same results as 
model 1. However, the rationale for splitting up the sample is no longer as 
strong, the hypothesis being rejected at the five- percent level as opposed to 
the one- percent level. Time is no longer significant, the average transition 
indicator being the only significant variable in the case of CEEB and wage in 
the case of CIS. 
 
Table 4. Results from estimation of model (2) 
Dependent 
variable:  
FDI  
Full sample CEEB CIS 
GDPln  
-0.12 
(1.25) 
-0.37 
(1.22) 
-0.52 
(1.99) 
-1.64 
(2.62) 
1.56 
(1.74) 
2.03 
(1.83) 
GG   0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
TRIln   
0.76 
(0.63) 
0.19 
(0.66) 
5.68*** 
(2.07) 
4.40 
(2.84) 
0.20 
(0.73) 
0.70 
(0.75) 
C M I  
 41
Wln  
0.62** 
(0.27) 
0.51* 
(0.27) 
0.57 
(0.80) 
0.60 
(0.81) 
0.56* 
(0.31) 
0.37 
(0.38) 
EDUSln  
2.14* 
(1.24) 
2.05* 
(1.20) 
1.31 
(2.34) 
1.40 
(2.37) 
2.08 
(1.48) 
2.02 
(1.49) 
EDUTln  
-0.01 
(0.74) 
-0.5 
(0.75) 
-0.41 
(1.25) 
-0.68 
(1.32) 
-1.02 
(1.09) 
-0.70 
(1.14) 
Constant -4.07 (10.60) 
-0.48 
(10.48) 
-1.99 
(16.78) 
10.42 
(25.14) 
-15.45 
(14.80) 
-20.15 
(15.78) 
Time  0.19** 
(0.08) 
 0.12 
(0.17) 
 0.18 
(0.20) 
0 all
 test;-F
:
0
=
i
uH
 F(24,66)= 
8.00 
F(24,65)= 
7.96 
F(12,31)= 
4.68 
F(12,30)= 
4.63 
F(11,29)= 
8.30 
F(11,29)= 
8.30 
 within2R  0.4361 0.4776 0.3914 0.4003 0.6105 0.6105 
Number of 
observations, 
T, and 
countries, n. 
T=4 n=23 
T=2 n=1 
T=3 n=1 
T=4 n=23 
T=2 n=1 
T=3 n=1 
T=4 n=12 
T=2 n=1 
T=4 n=12 
T=2 n=1 
T=4 n=11 
T=3 n=1 
T=4 n=11 
T=3 n=1 
The coefficients are given as well as the standard error in parenthesis. * imply a  10 percent 
level of significance, ** imply a 5 percent level of significance and *** imply a  1 percent level 
of significance 
 
The information available on FDI in the CEEC offers support for the 
sequential entry hypotheses of the Uppsala school at an early stage of 
internationalisation. All of the former socialist countries are at this early stage, 
implying the insights gained may well describe the development and predict 
the evolution of internationalisation in these areas. The need for local 
knowledge may prompt the use of local partners at an early stage of entry. 
Countries in close psychic distance appear to be more important sources of 
FDI in the region. Also, the level of investments is rising over time and the 
type of FDI appears to be changing. 
 
Summing up, the results indicate a difference in motive for investing in CIS 
and in CEE and BS. Whereas size of the market is a significant determinant in 
CIS, only progress in transition seems to influence the inflow of FDI in the 
CEE and BS. Natural resources were not included in the empirical analysis due 
to lack of data. However, the experience of countries such as Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan clearly indicate an important role for resource seeking activities in 
the area. The findings thus support a hypothesis of market seeking and 
resource-seeking investments prevail in CIS. Investments in the CEE and BS on 
the other hand appear more risk sensitive suggesting a role for the efficiency-
seeking or vertical investments. Thus, as an economy progresses in transition 
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and knowledge on the country is accumulated and available, market insecurity 
is reduced changing the nature of investment and increasing the level of 
investment. 
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Summary
ISSN 0804-3639
This paper provides an analysis of foreign direct investments
to the countries of the former Soviet Union and 10 of the former
socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
Foreign direct investments to the region is highly concentrated,
Poland receiving close to 25 percent of the inflow on average
from 1994-1998. There also appears to be a rather striking
relationship of close psychic distance between host and source
countries. Germany in particular, but also other Western
European countries are the most important source countries
for FDI in CEE. The Scandinavian countries are important in
relative terms in the Baltic (B) countries. So is Asia in the
Central Asian and Turkey in the Turkish speaking countries
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A
regression analysis of data from 1994-1998 is performed to
identify determinants of FDI. The results indicate a difference
in motive for investing in CIS and in CEE and B. Whereas
size of the market is a significant determinant in CIS, only
progress in transition seems to influence the inflow of FDI in
CEE and B. Natural resources were not included in the
empirical analysis due to lack of data. However, the experience
of countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan clearly
indicate an important role for resource seeking activities in
the area. The findings thus support a hypothesis of market
seeking and resource-seeking investments prevail in CIS.
Investments in CEE and B on the other hand appear more risk
sensitive suggesting a role for the efficiency-seeking or vertical
investments. Thus, as an economy progresses in transition and
knowledge on the country is accumulated and available,
market insecurity is reduced changing the nature of investment
and increasing the level of investment.
